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Abstract
Hardware support for trusted execution in modern CPUs en-
ables tenants to shield their data processing workloads in
otherwise untrusted cloud environments. Runtime systems for
the trusted execution must rely on an interface to the untrusted
host OS to use external resources such as storage, network,
and other functions. Attackers may exploit this interface to
leak data or corrupt the computation.
We describe SGX-LKL, a system for running Linux bina-
ries inside of Intel SGX enclaves that only exposes a minimal,
protected and oblivious host interface: the interface is (i) mini-
mal because SGX-LKL uses a complete library OS inside the
enclave, including file system and network stacks, which re-
quires a host interface with only 7 calls; (ii) protected because
SGX-LKL transparently encrypts and integrity-protects all
data passed via low-level I/O operations; and (iii) oblivious
because SGX-LKL performs host operations independently
of the application workload. For oblivious disk I/O, SGX-
LKL uses an encrypted ext4 file system with shuffled disk
blocks. We show that SGX-LKL protects TensorFlow training
with a 21% overhead.
1 Introduction
In domains such as healthcare [3,73,107] and finance [20,53],
it is challenging to run sensitive workloads in public cloud
environments due to security concerns [23]. For example,
when training a machine learning model, both the training
data and the model may be confidential, and the integrity of
the model must be ensured.
In a cloud environment, however, the data and computation
may be disclosed or corrupted due to cloud infrastructure
bugs [44], misconfigurations [92], rogue administrators [36,
63], or external attacks [6, 43].
Modern Intel [24], ARM [7] and AMD [4] CPUs offer hard-
ware support for trusted execution environments (TEEs) [83].
A TEE protects the confidentiality and integrity of compu-
tation and data that is shielded from the rest of the system.
Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [24] add new CPU
instructions that give userspace processes the ability to ex-
ecute code within isolated memory regions called enclaves.
The contents of SGX enclaves are encrypted and integrity-
protected transparently by the hardware.
Cloud providers have begun to roll out support for
TEEs [47,65]. This makes a “lift-and-shift” model—in which
tenants move a whole application to a TEE—an attrac-
tive proposition. TEE runtime systems, such as Haven [10],
SCONE [8] and Graphene-SGX [95], have demonstrated the
feasibility of executing complete Linux applications inside
TEEs with acceptable performance overheads.
When applications inside a TEE require external resources,
such as files, the network or other OS functions, they must rely
on the untrusted host OS. TEE runtime systems therefore have
a host interface, but its security implications are poorly un-
derstood and handled: the host interface may (i) accidentally
expose state from the TEE to the outside by leaking sensitive
data in calls [91]; (ii) act as a side channel where the exis-
tence or absence of a call reveals application state [101]; and
(iii) have a malicious implementation and thus compromise
application integrity inside the TEE [19].
Existing TEE runtime systems vary in the types of inter-
faces that they expose to hosts, and the nature of the interface
is a consequence of their design. As a result, current systems
expose wide and difficult-to-protect host interfaces, which
may compromise the security guarantees of TEEs.
We explore the opposite approach: we begin our design of a
TEE runtime system with a desired secure host interface, and
then decide on the necessary system support inside the TEE.
We aim for a host interface with three properties: (1) mini-
mality—only functionality that cannot be provided inside the
TEE should be part of it; (2) protection—all data that crosses
the host interface must be encrypted and integrity-protected;
and (3) obliviousness—the presence or absence of host calls
should not disclose information about the application state.
We describe SGX-LKL, a new TEE runtime system that
executes unmodified Linux binaries inside Intel SGX enclaves
while exposing a minimal, data-protected and oblivious host
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interface.1 To protect the host interface, the design of SGX-
LKL makes three contributions:
(1) Minimal host interface (§3). SGX-LKL only requires
a host interface with 7 calls, exposing only low-level func-
tionality for block-level I/O for storage and packet-level I/O
for networking. Higher-level POSIX functionality is imple-
mented in SGX-LKL by porting a complete Linux-based
library OS to an SGX enclave. SGX-LKL uses the Linux
Kernel Library (LKL) [80] to obtain a mature POSIX imple-
mentation, including a virtual file systems layer and a TCP/IP
network stack.
(2) Protected host interface (§4). SGX-LKL ensures that all
I/O operations across the host interface are encrypted and
integrity-protected transparently: (i) for file I/O, SGX-LKL
uses an encrypted Linux ext4 root file system image stored out-
side of the SGX enclave, which is accessed using the device
mapper framework [30] of the Linux kernel; and (ii) for net-
work I/O, SGX-LKL creates a virtual private network (VPN)
overlay that secures all network traffic. Layer-3 IP packets
are encrypted by the in-kernel Wireguard [105] VPN imple-
mentation.
To verify the integrity of a SGX-LKL instance and provide
cryptographic keys, SGX-LKL supports a runtime attestation
and provisioning process: it first attests the integrity of the
SGX-LKL implementation inside the SGX enclave and then
provisions the instance with the keys required to access the
encrypted root file system image and the VPN channels.
(3) Oblivious host interface (§5). To prevent any informa-
tion leakage as part of the host interface, SGX-LKL makes the
calls independent of the application workload inside the SGX
enclave: (i) SGX-LKL executes host calls in fixed batches,
and each batch includes the same number of calls by adding
indistinguishable dummy calls; (ii) for block I/O requests,
SGX-LKL uses an oblivious construction that reuses the ex-
isting ext4 file system image format. The encrypted blocks in
the file system image are shuffled, which only exposes a ran-
dom access pattern to the host. Between shuffles, SGX-LKL
reads a block at most once by relying on the in-enclave page
cache.
Our experimental evaluation shows that SGX-LKL expose a
secure host interface with a reasonable performance overhead.
With emulated SGX enclaves (to ignore current SGX memory
limitations), SGX-LKL trains common deep neural network
models using TensorFlow [93] with an overhead of 14%–
21% with oblivious calls. With current SGX hardware, SGX-
LKL runs PARSEC benchmarks that fit into SGX memory
with an average overhead of 1.5× and 3.1× with and without
oblivious calls, respectively.
1SGX-LKL is available as open-source software: https://github.com/
lsds/sgx-lkl.
2 Host Interfaces for Trusted Execution
We analyse current host interfaces of TEE runtime systems.
2.1 Trusted execution environments in clouds
We assume that a cloud provider supports CPU-implemented
trusted execution environments (TEEs). TEEs separate
userspace code and data from the rest of the system, including
higher privileged system software such as the OS kernel [37].
Multiple TEE implementations are commercially available,
including Intel SGX [24], ARM TrustZone [7] and AMD
SEV [4], with several others under way [57, 74, 86].
Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [24] provide new
CPU instructions to create TEEs called enclaves. Enclave
memory is encrypted and integrity-protected transparently
by the CPU. The CPU controls transitions from untrusted
to enclave code, and only enclave code can access enclave
memory. Due to this isolation, enclave code has no I/O access
but must use the untrusted host OS kernel.
Intel SGX also supports attestation, allowing a remote party
to validate the enclave code. For this, the CPU (i) measures
the enclave’s contents by computing a hash; (ii) signs the
measurement hash; and (iii) provides it to the attesting party.
The attestor can verify the signature and the hash.
For the deployment of applications using TEEs, we focus
on a lift-and-shift model [71]: users deploy unmodified Linux
binaries. For binary compatibility, this requires a TEE runtime
system [8, 10, 95], which provides POSIX abstractions. TEE
runtime systems must use functionality by the untrusted host
OS for operations outside of the trust domain of the TEE, e.g.
when using I/O resources. We refer to the interface between
the TEE runtime system and the host as the host interface.
2.2 Security goals and threat model
We want to prevent an adversary from compromising the
confidentiality and integrity of (i) the application code, (ii) its
input and output data, and (iii) all computation inside the
TEE.
We consider all software outside the TEE as untrusted and
under adversarial control, including the host OS kernel. We
assume that the TEE itself is trustworthy because existing
attacks against TEEs, e.g. Spectre [61], Foreshadow [98] and
Zombieload [85], are implementation-specific and orthogo-
nal to our work. They exploit flaws in specific TEE imple-
mentations and can be mitigated through hardware and/or
microcode changes [51]. As the maturity of different TEE
implementations, especially new open-source ones [4, 49, 57],
grows over time, such attacks will become rarer. Cache side
channel attacks [16, 41, 68] are not specific to TEEs because
they are enabled by micro-architectural resource sharing.
They require fundamental mitigations through compiler tech-
niques [15, 21, 72] and defensive programming [28, 75, 84].
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Our threat model focuses on attacks against the host in-
terface, as these are easy to carry out and do not assume
particular micro-architectural behaviour. An adversary can
(i) compromise confidentiality: they may observe the param-
eters, frequencies and sequences of host calls. For example,
they can observe the disk I/O access pattern to determine
the application or workload being run, e.g. linear scans and
repeated accesses are easy to identify via the host interface.
This side channel discloses information about the TEE exe-
cution; (ii) compromise integrity: the adversary may modify
the input/output parameters of host calls, repeatedly perform
arbitrary host calls or interfere with their execution outside of
the TEE [19]. For example, an adversary may cause memory
corruption inside the TEE to inject malicious code [58].
2.3 Host interfaces of current TEE runtime
systems
Next we analyse the security of the host interfaces of three
existing TEE runtime systems:
(1) Panoply [87] minimises the size of the trusted computing
base (TCB) inside the TEE. It places the glibc standard C
library [79] outside and implements a shim layer that forwards
calls. Panoply exposes the largest host interface because it
delegates all C library calls to the host.
(2) Graphene-SGX [95] reduces the size of the host interface
compared to Panoply by implementing a partial library OS
inside the TEE. It relies on the host for the file system, network
stack, and threading implementations.
(3) Haven [10] uses the Drawbridge library OS [78] to execute
Windows applications. Drawbridge also provides file system
and network stack implementations inside the enclave.
Types of host interface parameters. In our security analy-
sis, we focus on the parameters of host calls because they can
leak information to the host or compromise enclave integrity.
We categorise parameters into five types, ordered by the diffi-
culty of protection from easiest to hardest: (i) variable-sized
buffers pass a user-defined byte array across the host inter-
face. They are used in file/network I/O operations, such as the
buf and count parameters in the read() call [82]; (ii) address
ranges represent parameters that refer to regions of untrusted
or trusted memory. Examples are the parameters passed to
mmap() and the return value of malloc(); (iii) pure/impure
identifiers point to entities: impure identifiers, e.g. a path
name, disclose information about the entity; pure identifiers,
e.g. a file descriptor, only identify an entity; and (iv) semantic
parameters refer to parameters with opaque semantics spe-
cific to the host call, such as mode and flags for file access
operations.
Tab. 1 shows the total number of host calls for each TEE
runtime system, categorised according to function (I/O, events,
time, threading).2 Panoply exposes a large host interface, with
2For Panoply and Graphene-SGX, the host calls are taken from the GitHub
302 host calls in total; Graphene-SGX and Haven require
38 and 24 host calls, respectively.
We break down the parameters according to the above
types, distinguishing between out parameters, which are
passed to the host and may compromise confidentiality, and
in parameters, which are passed into the TEE and may affect
integrity.
Confidentiality attacks. To learn sensitive information, an
adversary may observe the host call parameters, and the data
disclosure depends on the type of out parameters:
(i) Variable-sized buffers may contain security-sensitive data.
Table 1 shows that Panoply, Graphene-SGX and Haven pass
11, 3 and 1 variable-sized buffers, respectively, to the host for
I/O operations; Panoply also uses a variable-sized buffer to
share messages between threads.
To ensure data confidentiality, the systems encrypt these
buffers, but they all disclose the buffer size to the host. If
the size is exposed, an adversary may infer size-dependent
secrets. In a machine learning application, e.g. image classi-
fication [56], the outcome of a classifier may have variable
length, which enables an adversary to learn the result by con-
sidering buffer lengths. Haven implements an in-enclave file
system and writes data to the host disk as fixed sized blocks;
Graphene-SGX writes 64-KB chunks of data. Such constant
buffer sizes still reveal the number of buffers.
(ii) Address ranges passed from the TEE to the host point
to continuous memory regions in untrusted memory. As part
of I/O operations, Panoply, Graphene-SGX, and Haven ex-
pose 17, 1 and 3 address ranges, respectively. An adversary
can observe the access pattern of the address range. For ex-
ample, Panoply uses untrusted memory address ranges for
communication between enclaves that isolate compartments
of the same application. An adversary can observe the ac-
cess pattern to reveal application-specific control flows, e.g. a
secret-dependent inter-enclave call.
(iii) Pure/impure identifiers. Panoply, Graphene-SGX, and
Haven use a large number of identifiers for I/O operations,
event handling and threading. Similar to address ranges, pass-
ing identifiers to the host reveals access patterns. For example,
for database searches using a TEE, Cash et al. [17] show that
an adversary can learn queries by observing record accesses.
Generally, pure identifiers reveal less information than im-
pure identifiers, e.g. file names, because pure identifiers are
typically chosen randomly. Preventing information leakage by
impure identifiers can only be done on a case-by-case basis,
e.g. by replacing file names with hashes. The above systems
do not provide any protection for impure identifiers.
(iv) Semantic parameters have a context-specific meaning and
therefore cannot be encrypted transparently. Existing runtime
systems pass many unprotected semantic parameters directly
to the host. In Panoply and Graphene-SGX, when opening
a file, the file access mode is leaked. For example, if a file
source code [42, 76]; for Haven, they are obtained from the paper [10].
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Table 1: Security breakdown of parameters in host interface calls for existing TEE runtime systems
TEE
runtime
system
Function Numberof host calls
Out parameters (impact confidentiality)
More difficult to protect
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
In parameters (impact integrity)
More difficult to protect
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Variable
size buffer
Address
range
Pure
identifier
Impure
identifier
Semantic
parameters
Variable
size buffer
Address
range
Pure
identifier
Impure
identifier
Semantic
parameters
Panoply [87]
I/O 239 11 17 96 49 139 10 2 22 24 74
Events 22 – – 5 – 22 – – 2 – 8
Time 12 – – – – 7 – – – – 10
Threading 29 1 – 10 – 17 2 – 4 – 10
Graphene-SGX [95]
I/O 29 3 1 18 6 19 3 2 2 4 7
Events 1 – – 1 – 1 – – – – 1
Time 2 – – – – 1 – – – – 2
Threading 6 – – – 1 4 1 – 1 – 1
Haven [10]
I/O 11 1 3 6 1 7 1 – 3 – 1
Events 6 – – 5 – 1 – – 1 – 3
Time 1 – – – – – – – – – 1
Threading 6 – – 1 – 2 – – 1 – –
SGX-LKL
I/O 4 2 – – – 2 2 – – – 4
Events 2 – – – – 1 – 1 – – 2
Time 1 – – – – – – – – – 1
Threading – – – – – – – – – – –
is always opened in a/a+ modes and written frequently, an
adversary may infer that it is a log file.
Integrity attacks. To compromise integrity, an adversary
must tamper with the parameters. Integrity-protecting in pa-
rameters varies in difficulty according to the parameter type:
(i) Variable-sized buffers passed to the TEE must have their
integrity protected. In I/O calls, Panoply, Graphene-SGX, and
Haven pass 10, 3 and 1 parameters with variable-sized buffers,
respectively, to the TEE. Panoply and Graphene-SGX also
use variable-sized buffers to communicate between threads.
This exposes two means of integrity attacks: an adversary
may modify (i) the buffer contents to violate data integrity;
and (ii) the buffer count to trigger an overflow. To ensure
buffer integrity, the contents must be protected by an HMAC.
The TEE must ensure the freshness of the HMAC, otherwise
an adversary can swap two valid buffers or perform a roll-
back attack. Panoply protects the integrity of the inter-enclave
communication buffer using a TLS connection, but it does not
do the same for file I/O; Graphene-SGX ensures the integrity
of file I/O by maintaining a Merkle tree of file chunk hashes
inside the enclave. However, it does not protect the integrity
of network I/O for applications without built-in TLS support.
To prevent buffer overflow attacks, the TEE must check
buffer lengths. All three runtime systems do this.
(ii) Address ranges passed into the TEE are difficult to in-
tegrity check. For I/O operations, Panoply and Graphene-
SGX pass 2 address ranges each into the TEE. They check
that the ranges are entirely inside or outside of TEE memory,
preventing an adversary from hijacking an enclave’s control
flow [12, 58].
An adversary, however, may still manipulate addresses by
reusing old ranges to roll back data, swapping ranges, or mod-
ifying ranges to corrupt data. All three runtime systems are
vulnerable to such attacks, and the only effective mitigation
is to avoid relying on untrusted address ranges.
(iii) Pure/impure identifiers are commonly used as in param-
eters: Panoply passes 46, 2, and 4 identifiers into the TEE
for I/O, events, and threading, respectively; Graphene-SGX
passes 6 identifiers for I/O and 1 for threading; Haven passes
3, 1, and 1 identifiers for I/O, events and threading, respec-
tively.
Adversaries may pass invalid or manipulated identifiers: if
two file descriptors are swapped, the enclave may access incor-
rect files. Such malicious activity can be detected: Graphene-
SGX maintains per-file HMACs, which reveal wrong file
descriptors; incorrect network sockets can be detected by
TLS.
(iv) Semantic parameters must have their integrity verified on
a case-by-case basis. All three systems use many semantic in
parameters for I/O, events, time and threading operations.
For the semantic parameters with few valid values, such as
errorcode and signum, the TEE can perform explicit checks;
for ones with a larger domain, such as size, bounds checks are
possible. None of these checks establish semantic correctness
though. Since both Panoply and Graphene-SGX rely on the
host file system, they can only check for the plausibility of
returned file meta-data, such as st_size and st_blocks.
2.4 Designing a secure host interface
From the above discussion, we observe that it is non-trivial
(and at worst impossible) to protect out parameters from leak-
ing information and exposing access patterns and to verify
the correctness of in parameters. Therefore, the first step in
designing a secure host interface is to keep it narrow and
minimise the number of parameters. Only functionality that
cannot be provided within an enclave should be delegated to
the host.
In addition, it is important to reduce the number and com-
plexity of host call parameters. By building on low-level host
calls instead of high-level POSIX abstractions the parameter
types become simpler. For example, Graphene-SGX relies on
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Call Description
I/O
disk_read(offset, buf, len) → int Read len bytes from disk image file at offset offset; returns bytes read
disk_write(offset, buf, len) → int Write len bytes from buf to disk image file at offset offset; returns bytes written
net_read(buf, len) → int Read at most len bytes from network device into buf; returns bytes read
net_write(buf, len) → int Write len bytes from buf to network device; returns bytes written
Events net_poll(eventmask) → reventmask Wait for eventmask events on network device; returns occurred events
forward_signal(num, code, addr) Forward signal num with description code occurred at addr to enclave
Time time_read() → time Read time from untrusted vDSO memory region
Table 2: SGX-LKL host interface
the host file system and thus must expose impure identifiers
such as file names. A secure host interface should avoid dele-
gating resource management to the host as much as possible.
Based on these principles, Tab. 1 shows the host calls and
parameter types of SGX-LKL, our TEE runtime system. It
avoids address range and pure/impure identifiers and only
requires simple semantic parameters.
3 Minimising the host interface
The SGX-LKL host interface is shown in Table 2. SGX-LKL
exposes only seven calls to the untrusted host, which relate to
functionality that cannot be provided inside an SGX enclave:
disk and network I/O operations, event handling, and time.
3.1 SGX-LKL host interface
I/O operations. SGX-LKL uses a low-level I/O interface. For
disk I/O, disk_read() and disk_write() read from and write
to a persistent block device, respectively. Each call takes an
offset into the block device, a pointer buf to a buffer, and
the length len of the data. For network I/O, net_read() and
net_write() receive and send network packets. Both calls
take a pointer buf to a buffer. For net_read, len contains the
buffer size; for net_write, it is the number of bytes to be
written.
Events. A net_poll() call passes an eventmask to the host
with the network events that SGX-LKL is waiting for. The
call blocks until network packets are available to be read or
outgoing packets can be sent. It returns which events have
occurred.
SGX-LKL must handle hardware exceptions, such as page
access violations or illegal instructions. An exception causes
an enclave exit and transfers control to the host kernel. A
forward_signal() call provides the signal description to the
enclave: the signal number num, the cause code, and the as-
sociated memory address addr. The exception is then either
processed by SGX-LKL directly or forwarded to the applica-
tion if it has registered a corresponding signal handler.
Time. A call time_read() reads the time from different clock
sources, such as the real-time and monotonic clocks. It is
used by application code requesting the current time and by
ext4 file system
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Figure 1: SGX-LKL architecture
SGX-LKL, e.g. to generate timer interrupts required by LKL
(see §3.2).
3.2 In-enclave OS functionality
The host interface described above allows SGX-LKL to ac-
cess low-level host resources, but Linux applications require
higher-level POSIX abstractions. To bridge this gap, SGX-
LKL provides the following OS functions inside the enclave:
(i) file system implementations; (ii) a TCP/IP network stack;
(iii) threading and scheduling; (iv) memory management;
(v) signal handling; and (vi) time. These OS functions are
typically made accessible to userspace through system calls
but, rather than invoking system calls directly, applications
link against a C standard library (libc). Similar to other TEE
runtime systems [8, 95], SGX-LKL includes a libc implemen-
tation to support unmodified binaries that are dynamically
linked against libc.
Fig. 1 shows the SGX-LKL architecture. Next we describe
the OS functionality provided inside the enclave in detail.
The parts responsible for protecting the host interface (shown
in green) and for making the interface oblivious (shown in
orange) are described in §4 and §5, respectively.
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An untrusted loader, sgx-lkl-run, creates the SGX enclave
and loads the enclave library libsgxlkl.so, which runs along-
side the application within the enclave. libsgxlkl.so includes a
modified musl [70] C standard library that redirects system
calls to an in-enclave library OS provided by the Linux Ker-
nel Library (LKL) [80]. LKL is an architecture port of the
Linux kernel to userspace. It enables SGX-LKL to make com-
ponents such as the Linux kernel page cache, work queues,
file system and network stack implementations, and crypto
libraries available inside the enclave. As it is intended to run
in userspace, LKL expects a set of LKL host operations, e.g.
to create threads or allocate memory. Therefore, libsgxlkl.so
includes further components for memory management, user-
level threading, signal handling and time.
File system implementation. Existing TEE runtime sys-
tems [8, 87, 95] forward POSIX file operations to a host
file system implementation. SGX-LKL cannot adopt this ap-
proach because it would expose security-sensitive metadata,
such as file names, file sizes, file permissions, and directory
structures. Instead, it provides complete in-enclave file sys-
tem implementations via the Linux virtual file system (VFS)
layer [14]. The VFS layer only requires two host operations
for block-level disk I/O (disk_read() and disk_write(), see
Table 2).
Applications operate on files through file descriptors as
usual, which are handled by the ext4 file system implementa-
tion of LKL. LKL forwards block-level I/O requests to a virtio
block device backend implemented by libsgxlkl.so, which is-
sues disk_read() and disk_write() calls. On the host, the
reads and writes are made to a single ext4 disk image file. The
image is mapped into memory by sgx-lkl-run. Since the disk
image file has a fixed size the read/write operations can be
implemented efficiently by directly reading and writing to the
mapped region from within the enclave.
This approach has three advantages: (i) it maintains a small
host interface with only two disk I/O calls; (ii) it ensures that
individual file accesses are not visible to the host, which can
only observe reads/writes to disk block offsets; and (iii) the in-
enclave VFS implementation supports different file systems,
such as the temporary in-memory file system /tmp, the /proc
file system, and /dev for special device files.
TCP/IP network stack. To provide a POSIX socket API,
SGX-LKL uses LKL’s TCP/IP stack to process packets within
the enclave. This has three advantages: (i) it minimises the
host interface because only access to a virtual network device
to send/receive Ethernet frames is needed; (ii) it enables SGX-
LKL to support any transport protocol, e.g. TCP or UDP,
without extra host calls; and (iii) it exposes Linux networking
features such as packet encryption (see §4.2).
To send/receive network traffic, sgx-lkl-run sets up a layer-
2 TAP device. SGX-LKL implements a corresponding vir-
tio network device backend inside the enclave. To be noti-
fied about incoming/outgoing packets, the backend issues a
net_poll() request. The return value indicates if the device
is ready for reading/writing packets using net_read() and
net_write().
Memory management. SGX-LKL does not interact with the
host for memory allocations/deallocations but a limitation
of SGX version 1 is that the enclave size must be fixed at
initialisation time. SGX-LKL therefore pre-allocates enclave
memory and provides low-level memory management primi-
tives inside the enclave. When an enclave is created, it initially
contains libsgxlkl.so, SGX-specific memory pages such as the
state save area (SSA) and thread control structure (TCS),
and an uninitialised heap area. The heap area is exposed
through both LKL and higher-level libc allocation functions,
such as malloc() and free() as well as mmap(), mremap(), and
munmap() directly implemented by SGX-LKL.
SGX-LKL supports both variable- and fixed-address anony-
mous mappings, and tracks free pages via a heap allocation
bitmap. It implements mmap() by scanning the bitmap for con-
secutive free pages large enough for the requested allocation.
To support private file mappings, files are loaded into enclave
because SGX enclaves are bound to a linear address space.
SGX-LKL must support changing page permissions, e.g.
when loading executables and libraries. In addition, applica-
tions may modify permissions directly: e.g. the Java Virtual
Machine (JVM) requires executable pages for just-in-time
compilation and changes of permissions for guard pages dur-
ing garbage collection. While SGX pages have their own
permissions, SGX version 1 requires these permissions to
be set on enclave creation and does not permit subsequent
changes.
As a workaround, SGX-LKL has an extra mem_protect()
host call. All enclave pages are created with full SGX page
permissions and the actual permissions are set via the host-
controlled page table permissions. Since relying on the host
to manage page permissions is a security risk, SGX version 2
adds the ability to control page permissions from within the
enclave.
Thread management. While SGX supports concurrency by
allowing multiple host threads to enter an enclave, the maxi-
mum number of enclave threads must be specified at enclave
creation time, which conflicts with dynamic thread creation.
In addition, having a one-to-one relation between enclave and
application threads means that the creation, joining, or exiting
of threads as well as thread synchronisation requires host OS
support, which poses a security threat [103].
Therefore, SGX-LKL implements user-level threading
based on the lthread library [62] and provides synchroni-
sation primitives inside the enclave. A fixed number of host
threads are assigned to enclave threads, which enter the en-
clave at startup and only leave when idle. Application threads
and LKL kernel threads are lthreads, managed via the stan-
dard pthreads interface. SGX-LKL implements futex calls to
provide other synchronisation primitives such as mutexes and
semaphores.
Signals. Applications can register custom signal handlers to
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handle exceptions, interrupts, or user-defined signals. Some
signals, such as SIGALRM, can be handled entirely within the en-
clave; others such SIGSEGV or SIGILL are caused by hardware
exceptions and result in an enclave exit and return control to
the host OS. SGX-LKL must forward these signals from the
untrusted host to custom signal handlers inside the enclave.
During initialisation, sgx-lkl-run registers signal handlers
for all catchable signals with the host. All signals are for-
warded via forward_signal(), which minimises the host in-
terface because no separate calls for registering handlers are
needed. It also hides application-specific handlers. SGX-LKL
then checks for a corresponding application-registered sig-
nal handler and, if present, delivers the signal, or ignores it
otherwise. Since application-registered signal handlers are
managed within the enclave, calls such as sigaction() and
sigprocmask() are supported without host interaction.
Time. Applications, libraries and LKL frequently access time
information, e.g. SGX-LKL reads the current time between
context switches reschedule blocked threads and to trigger
timer interrupts. Current SGX implementations, however, do
not offer a high-performance in-enclave time source, and
SGX-LKL relies on time provided by the host.
Instead of issuing expensive individual host calls, SGX-
LKL uses the virtual dynamic shared object (vDSO) [100]
mechanism of the Linux kernel. The kernel maps a small
shared library to the address space outside of the enclave.
On each clock tick, the host kernel updates a shared memory
location with the current time for various clock sources, which
are read from within the enclave when a time-related call is
made.
For high precision, the vDSO mechanism requires the
RDTSCP instruction to adjust for the time passed since the last
vDSO update. In SGX version 1, the this instruction is not per-
mitted inside enclaves. The accuracy of clock_gettime() in
SGX-LKL thus depends on the frequency of vDSO updates;
SGX version 2 does not have this limitation.
Illegal instructions. Applications use the RDTSC instruction to
read the timestamp counter or CPUID to discover CPU features.
These instructions, however, are illegal inside SGX version 1
enclaves. As SGX-LKL must support unmodified binaries,
illegal instructions cannot be replaced by corresponding host
calls.
Instead, SGX-LKL catches the resulting SIGILL exception
and emulates the instructions: RDTSC is executed outside the
enclave, and the result is forwarded via the forward_signal()
call; for CPUID, SGX-LKL caches all CPUID information during
enclave set-up. This eliminates the need for an extra host
call and also hides the CPUID information requested by an
application.
4 Protecting the host interface
We now describe how SGX-LKL protects host calls from
attacks.
4.1 Protecting disk I/O calls
Host disk blocks must have their confidentiality and integrity
protected. For this, SGX-LKL uses the Linux device mapper
subsystem [30], which maps lower-level virtual block devices,
such as SGX-LKL’s virtio backend, to higher-level devices
and allows for I/O data to be transformed along the way. VFS
file systems such as ext4 use the virtual block device exposed
by device mapper. Data can be encrypted and integrity pro-
tected transparently before it reaches the underlying device.
SGX-LKL uses different device mapper targets: (i) dm-
crypt [32] provides full-disk encryption using AES in XTS
mode with the sector number as an initialisation vector;
(ii) dm-verity [34] offers volume-level read-only integrity
protection through a Merkle tree of disk block hashes stored
on the virtual disk; and (iii) dm-integrity [33] provides key-
based block-level read/write integrity protection. For both
AES-XTS and AES-GCM, SGX-LKL uses hardware acceler-
ation through Intel’s AES-NI instruction set extension.
SGX-LKL combines the different targets to provide both
confidentiality and integrity for block reads/writes, depend-
ing on the security requirements of the application. For ex-
ample, for an in-memory caching application such as Mem-
cached [64], it is sufficient to protect the integrity of a read-
only disk with dm-verity: the Memcached binary stored on
disk must have its integrity protected, but no further sensitive
data is stored on the disk. If the application itself is confiden-
tial or other application data is written to disk, dm-crypt can
be used with either of the integrity protection targets. The use
of different targets affects I/O performance, as we explore
in §6.2.
4.2 Protecting network I/O calls
SGX-LKL must guarantee the confidentiality and integrity
of all network data. Existing TEE runtime systems either
require applications to have built-in support for network en-
cryption [10, 95] or use TLS [8]. Not all application-level
protocols, however, can use TLS transparently.
Instead, SGX-LKL exploits having a complete TCP/IP net-
work stack inside the enclave, which enables it to provide
transparent low-level network encryption. All data received
and sent via the net_read() and net_write() host calls is auto-
matically encrypted, authenticated and integrity-protected. To
protect all network traffic, SGX-LKL uses Wireguard [105],
a layer 3 virtual private network (VPN) protocol, currently
proposed for inclusion in the Linux kernel [60].
SGX-LKL sets up Wireguard at initialisation time and ex-
poses the VPN to the application through a network device
with its own IP address. An application binding to this IP
address is only reachable by trusted nodes in the VPN. Each
Wireguard peer has a public/private key pair, which is bound
to a VPN IP address and an endpoint, an (IP, port) pair through
which the VPN is accessible. Wireguard uses the asymmetric
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key pairs to establish ephemeral symmetric session keys to
protect messages using authenticated encryption, and nonces
to prevent replay attacks. In contrast to TLS, which uses cer-
tificates, Wireguard identifies parties through public keys. It
does not perform key distribution—SGX-LKL binds keys to
enclave identities and supports provisioning of peers’ keys
(see §4.4).
4.3 Protecting event and time calls
For the remaining calls in Table 2, SGX-LKL must ensure that
an adversary cannot learn confidential data or compromise
integrity by providing invalid data.
net_poll(). While the eventmask reveals if the enclave wants
to receive/send packets, this is already disclosed by the
net_read and net_write calls. An adversary can return a
wrong eventmask: as a result, either the net_read call fails,
which can be handled transparently, or an invalid packet is
read that fails Wireguard’s integrity protection (see §4.2).
forward_signal(). SGX-LKL must ensure that signals cor-
respond to genuine events with valid signal descriptions—
otherwise an adversary can cause an application signal han-
dler to execute with invalid signal data. For signals triggered
by hardware exceptions, SGX-LKL ensures that the passed ad-
dress lies within the enclave range (e.g. SIGSEGV) or replaces
the address with the current instruction pointer for signals
that refer to a faulting instruction (e.g. SIGILL and SIGFPE).
SGX-LKL can be configured to ignore user-controlled signals
(e.g. SIGINT).
time_read(). A challenge to integrity is that the returned time
cannot be trusted. An adversary may return a timestamp that
is not monotonically increasing and thus cause an underflow
when an application calculates a timespan. SGX-LKL there-
fore checks for monotonicity for CLOCK_MONOTONIC_* clock
sources.
Note that the official Intel SGX SDK provides trusted time
for enclaves based on the Intel Management Engine (ME).
Accesses, however, is slow and requests can be delayed by an
adversary. Future TEE implementations may provide practical
trustworthy time sources, which SGX-LKL could use.
4.4 Runtime attestation and secret provision-
ing
SGX-LKL must execute securely in an untrusted and poten-
tially malicious environment. For this, it must allow (i) parties
to remotely attest that they execute a trustworthy version of
SGX-LKL in a genuine SGX enclave; (ii) applications to be
deployed securely, i.e. guaranteeing both the confidentiality
and integrity of application code; and (iii) applications to be
provisioned securely with secrets such as cryptographic keys,
configurations, and sensitive application data.
The above requirements go beyond the attestation mech-
anisms of current SGX SDKs [50, 66]. While current SDKs
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Figure 2: Deployment workflow for SGX-LKL
can attest a single enclave library, they assume that all ap-
plication code is compiled into the library, and an enclave
measurement therefore is sufficient to verify integrity. They
also do not protect the confidentiality of the application code.
Applications typically must implement their own mechanism
for secret provisioning, which is cumbersome.
SGX-LKL addresses these issues as part of three phases:
(i) application provisioning, (ii) remote attestation and (iii) se-
cret provisioning. Fig. 2 shows the deployment workflow, in-
volving three parties: (i) a service provider (SP) that wants to
deploy an application and has a trusted client. For a distributed
application, this may involve deploying multiple trusted peers;
(ii) an untrusted host controlled by a cloud provider (CP)
provodes enclaves; and (iii) the Intel Attestation Service (IAS),
which allows the SP to verify an enclave measurement.
(1) Application provisioning. In step ¶, the trusted client
creates a disk image with the application binary and its depen-
dencies. It can be created e.g. by exporting a Docker container
image [35]—SGX-LKL provides a sgx-lkl-create tool to
simplify the disk image creation process. The tool is based on
cryptsetup [27], which configures dm-crypt for disk encryp-
tion and integrity protection. It outputs the disk encryption
key and the root hash of the Merkle tree for dm-verity integrity
protection. In step ·, the disk image file is sent to the CP. In
preparation for attestation in step ¸, the client generates a
Wireguard asymmetric key pair.
(2) Remote attestation. In step¹, the public key of the attes-
tation key pair and the disk ID identifying the image is sent
to the cloud host. The host then creates an enclave contain-
ing libsgxlkl.so (step º). libsgxlkl.so boots LKL, sets up the
networking, and generates its Wireguard key pair.
Now the enclave can be attested: libsgxlkl.so creates a
report with a measurement of the enclave code. SGX allows
custom data to be included with the report, which SGX-LKL
uses to add the generated public key. The report is signed
by an Intel-provided quoting enclave, and the resulting quote
together with the enclave’s public key is returned to the SP in
step ». In step ¼, the SP sends the quote to the IAS, which
returns a verification report, which is checked by the SP.
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(3) Secret provisioning. After successful attestation, the SP
establishes a secure communication channel with the enclave
using the enclave public key. libsgxlkl.so takes a single Wire-
guard peer as an argument, which guarantees that no other
party can communicate with the enclave.
In step½, the SP sends the following information to the en-
clave: (i) the disk encryption key; (ii) the root hash; (iii) public
keys of other trusted peers; and (iv) configuration data, includ-
ing the path to the executable and its application arguments.
In step Ł, libsgxlkl.so mounts the disk and sets up the de-
vice mapper targets for decryption/integrity. It adds the new
Wireguard peers, loads the application, and begins execution.
5 Making the host interface oblivious
As explained in §2.3, an adversary can compromise the confi-
dentiality of an application by observing the execution of host
calls. There are three characteristics of host calls that are side
channels: (i) frequencies of calls, i.e. their number and time
intervals. For example, there may be more host calls when an
application processes data on disk, thus revealing information
about its execution; (ii) sequences of calls, i.e. the order in
which host calls are executed and the relationships between
them. For example, an application may always execute reads
before writes, allowing an adversary to make inferences about
the execution; and (iii) parameters of calls. Although SGX-
LKL encrypts data blocks written to the disk (§4.1), the block
offset reveals which file location is accessed. Observing the
same offset repeatedly discloses the data layout on disk.
The main idea to mitigate against these side-channels is to
make the host call interface oblivious [39], i.e. ensuring that
the sequence and frequency of calls as well as any observable
parameters appear to be workload independent. We focus on
the disk I/O host calls and discuss other calls in §5.4.
5.1 Disk I/O calls
SGX-LKL exposes two disk I/O calls to the host: disk_read()
and disk_write(). These read and write fixed-size encrypted
blocks at the specified offset (see §4.1). To prevent these calls
from revealing information, SGX-LKL employs several tech-
niques: (i) regarding frequencies, SGX-LKL discretises the
execution of read/write calls into fixed time-interval rounds.
In each round, it executes a fixed number of calls in a batch,
potentially adding indistinguishable dummy calls; (ii) regard-
ing sequences, SGX-LKL makes the order of read/write calls
deterministic per batch by issuing them in a predefined order,
e.g. always executing reads before writes; and (iii) regarding
parameters, SGX-LKL ensures that all call parameters appear
random, obscuring patterns. SGX-LKL makes accesses obliv-
ious by using seemingly random offset parameters. Repeated
accesses to the same disk block appear indistinguishable.
5.2 Hiding disk I/O accesses
SGX-LKL discretises the execution of all calls into fixed
interval batches. Every t time units, SGX-LKL performs a
single disk_read() followed by a disk_write(). When the
LKL filesystem layer (see §3.2) issues a disk I/O call, instead
of submitting it directly to the host, it is added to a host call
queue. SGX-LKL’s lthread scheduler checks if enough time
has elapsed, and then issues the next call from the queue.
If there are too many read/write calls in the queue, the
remaining calls are delayed until the next batch. Conversely,
if there are not enough read/write calls from the application,
SGX-LKL issues dummy calls to random blocks in order to
pad that batch. This is done through dummy files in the file
system and reading/writing blocks of those files.
The timing parameter t must be tuned for good performance
because applications issue system calls at different rates: if t
is lower than the application’s call rate, SGX-LKL will issue
more batches with dummy calls; if t is too high, the appli-
cation will make slow progress. In our experiments, we use
t = 0.1 ms, which works well across a range of applications
workloads.
5.3 Hiding disk I/O parameters
Although SGX-LKL hides the number of calls, the call pa-
rameters (see Tab. 2) still leak information: (i) the data being
read or written in buf; (ii) the disk offset; and (iii) the buffer
length len. To hide the buf parameter, SGX-LKL uses proba-
bilistic encryption [40], which re-encrypts data before writing
it (see §4.1). This prevents an adversary from discerning if
written data is old or new, thus tracing data movement.
To hide the offset parameter, two traces of block access
patterns must be indistinguishable from each other. File I/O
calls made by the application pass through the file system
layer, which can handle them from the LKL page cache, which
is opaque to the host, or expose them to the host. The file
system layer stores the mapping from logical to physical disk
blocks. To hide repeated block accesses from the adversary,
SGX-LKL must therefore shuffle blocks by changing this
logical to physical block mapping in a manner opaque to the
adversary.
Existing techniques from oblivious RAM (ORAM) [29,
39, 59, 89, 90, 102] can be used to provide oblivious access
to blocks. LKL’s page cache makes it well-suited to employ
square root ORAM [39]—the page cache is analogous to a
“shelter”. As it is private to the enclave, it precludes, however,
the need to scan it in its entirety for each access. and allows
data to be accessed directly. Once a block has been added to
the page cache, subsequent accesses to the same block are
served from the page cache, until the page is removed, or
flushed to disk. If such evicted blocks are requested again,
the adversary could observe this. Therefore, SGX-LKL must
obliviously reshuffle blocks before continuing with execu-
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Algorithm 1: Oblivious ext4 file sytem shuffle
Data: FDs: file descriptors of files to be shuffled
LP: logical to physical block mapping for file system
Result: LP_n: new logical to physical block mapping for file system
1 for fd in FDs do // find file with largest size
2 file_blk := num_blocks(fd);
3 max_blk := max(max_blk, file_blk);
4 num_shuff_blk := num_shuff_blk + file_blk;
5 /* create donor files to be used for the swap */
6 free_blk := get_num_free_blocks_in_fs();
7 num_donors := free_blk / max_blk;
8 donor_files := init_donors(num_donors);
9 /* generate new random permutation of source blocks */
10 src_blks_perm := map_src_blk_to_num(FDs);
11 src_blk_new_perm := FisherYatesShuffle(src_blk_perm);
12 for id in (0 .. num_shuff_blk) do // get fd & block no. for id
13 fd := fd_for_id(src_blk_new_perm, id);
14 block_no := blk_no_for_id(src_blk_new_perm, id);
15 donor = pick_rand_donor(num_donors);
16 /* swap source block with donor block */
17 fetch_source_block(block_no);
18 ioctl(EXT4_IOC_MOVE_EXT, fd, donors_files[donor], block_no);
19 unlink_all_files(donor_files);
tion [39].
An oblivious shuffle moves blocks around so that an adver-
sary cannot correlate the blocks before and after the shuffle.
SGX-LKL uses a k-oblivious shuffle [77]. This assumes that k
of the n source blocks are in the private cache. The algorithm
then sequentially moves the n blocks from the source (either
from the disk or from the cache) to the destination according
to a randomly generated permutation of the blocks.
Alg. 1 describes the shuffle algorithm. Instead of shuffling
the full disk, we assume a list of files that need to be shuffled,
which can be obtained from a trace of files opened by the ap-
plication. We divide the disk blocks into two parts: (i) blocks
that belong to files that must be shuffled, i.e. the source array
of size n; and (ii) a destination array of n unallocated blocks.
First, the algorithm determines the size max_blk of the
largest file to be shuffled (lines 1–4), the number of free
blocks (line 6). It uses this information to create a set of donor
files (line 8), each of size max_blk, to fill up the free blocks.
This set of donor files is used for swapping blocks with the
source files. Next, the algorithm assigns an ordering to the
blocks of the source files that need to be shuffled (line 10),
mapping the set of source file blocks to natural numbers. It
uses a Fisher-Yates shuffle [54] to produce a random permu-
tation of the source file blocks (line 11). The algorithm then
performs an iteration per source block to be shuffled (line 12).
At each iteration, it determines the source file descriptor and
file block number that maps to the current index according
to the new permutation (lines 13–14). If the source block is
already in the page cache, an unread source block, if any, is
accessed and brought into the page cache (line 17).
Finally, a random donor file is selected, and the source
block is swapped with the block from the donor file (line 18).
The algorithm is implemented at the LKL ext4 layer because
the shuffled blocks must be decrypted/encrypted by dm-crypt,
as discussed in §4.1. The ext4 layer also stores the logical/-
physical block mapping, which needs to be modified when
blocks are swapped. SGX-LKL uses the EXT4_IOC_MOVE_EXT
ioctl() call for this, which exchanges the blocks belonging
to two different files, while also updating the underlying meta-
data. Once all the block have been swapped, the dummy files
are unlinked, and the corresponding blocks become unallo-
cated again.
5.4 Other host calls
Network I/O. To hide access patterns in network traffic, noise
in the form of dummy network packets can be added to gen-
erate a constant stream of fixed size packets sent between
participating trusted nodes [96, 99]. To an adversary, regu-
lar packets become indistinguishable from dummy packets,
which are dropped by receivers. To scale to more clients, traf-
fic could be routed through a trusted proxy, which establishes
a single connection with each SGX-LKL enclave.
Signals. Signals caused by the application disclose sensitive
information. For example, if an application executes an illegal
instruction, the resulting signal is observable. As described in
§4.3, SGX-LKL hides what instruction caused the signal but
cannot hide the exception itself. This is a limitation of Intel
SGX—future TEE implementation may handle exceptions
without host involvement.
Time. The host kernel updates a vDSO memory region with
the current time (see §3.2). It is read by the enclave, which is
observable by an adversary. However, the SGX-LKL sched-
uler accesses time frequently on each context switch, and an
adversary cannot distinguish between accesses from SGX-
LKL and the application, hiding application-specific access
patterns.
6 Evaluation
To understand the performance impact of SGX-LKL’s design
choices, we evaluate it with real application workloads and
microbenchmarks. We conduct all the experiments on SGX-
enabled machines with Intel Xeon E3-1280 4-core CPUs with
8 MB LLC, 64 GB RAM, and a 10-Gbps network card. The
machines run Ubuntu Linux 18.04, Linux Kernel 4.15.0-46,
with the Intel SGX driver version 2.5.
Our SGX version has an EPC size of 128 MB, and only
around 90 MB are available to user applications. Since this
limit is likely to increase in the future, we evaluate SGX-LKL
in both simulation and hardware modes to ignore the overhead
due to EPC paging. When using the oblivious host interface,
we randomise the disk image and set the page cache size to
be large enough for the input data.
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Figure 4: Inference throughput with TensorFlow
6.1 Application performance
We evaluate the performance of SGX-LKL with two data-
intensive workloads, TensorFlow [1] and PARSEC [11].
TensorFlow. We use TensorFlow (TF) [1] for training and
inference. The models are selected from TF’s benchmark
suite [94], representing different type of networks, both small
(ResNet-34) and large (AlexNet, ResNet-101) as well as deep
and low-dimensional (ResNet-50). The input datasets are CI-
FAR10 [55] and a subset of ImageNet [48]. We use the default
benchmark suite settings. All experiments are executed na-
tively and in SGX-LKL with and without disk encryption
and oblivious host calls, respectively. To avoid SGX paging
effects, we run in simulation mode with an enclave size of
12.5 GB.
In Fig. 3, we report the training throughput with SGX-
LKL in different modes compared to native execution. SGX-
LKL outperforms native in simulation mode: the training
throughput of ResNet-34, ResNet-50 and ResNet-101 is
higher than native by 28%, 33% and 32%, respectively. SGX-
LKL achieves better performance due to LKL’s implemen-
tation of system calls as standard function calls. The results
also show that the overhead of disk encryption and integrity
checking is negligible.
With oblivious host calls with disk encryption, SGX-LKL
experiences a slow-down: the training throughput for AlexNet
decreases by 24% (ImageNet) and 37% (CIFAR10) compared
to simulation mode, or 14% and 21% compared to native
execution. The impact of oblivious host calls on the ResNet
models is less significant: the training performance of SGX-
LKL is almost equal to native. This is due to the different
I/O characteristics of the networks: AlexNet processes more
images than ResNet per second, thus stressing the oblivious
host calls and requiring more shuffle operations.
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Figure 5: Execution overhead for PARSEC workloads
In Fig. 4, we also explore inference throughput with SGX-
LKL in different modes compared to native. The results show
the same trend as training: the inference throughput is higher
than the native system by 22% for AlexNet with ImageNet,
42% for AlexNet with CIFAR10, 29% for ResNet-34, 26% for
ResNet 50, and 20% for ResNet 101. The throughput is lower
than native with oblivious host calls by 79% (AlexNet with
ImageNet), 15% (AlexNet with CIFAR-10), 53% (ResNet-
101), 50% (ResNet-50), and 43% (ResNet-34). We conclude
that CPU-intensive networks are less affected by the oblivious
call interface, while I/O-intensive networks are more affected.
PARSEC. We use five PARSEC benchmarks [97] with dif-
ferent working set sizes to explore the performance of SGX-
LKL in SGX hardware mode. All workloads execute with
four threads, and the input size is “simlarge”.
Fig. 5 shows the execution with SGX-LKL with different
security guarantees. Without oblivious host calls, SGX-LKL
in simulation mode is 1.05× slower than native. The overhead
for streamcluster is 1.07×; fluidanimate has the same perfor-
mance as native; for canneal and blackscholes, the slowdown
is 1.12× and 1.13×, respectively. We conclude that, without
EPC size limitations, the performance of SGX-LKL without
oblivious host calls is comparable to native execution.
In hardware mode, the overhead of workloads with the
small to medium working set sizes is 1.3× (streamcluster),
1.4× (blackscholes) and 1.7× (bodytrack). With large work-
ing sets, fluidanimate and canneal are slower by 4× and 15×,
respectively, which is due to the limited EPC size.
With oblivious host calls, streamcluster shows similar over-
heads in simulation (2.4×) and hardware modes (2.8×). Since
streamcluster does not have input files, no shuffling is re-
quired, and the overhead solely comes from the dummy calls;
for benchmarks with input files, e.g. blackscholes, the over-
head in hardware mode is higher (3.6×) due to the shuffling.
For fluidanimate and canneal, which have large memory foot-
prints, we observe an overhead of up to 2× in simulation; in
hardware mode, the overhead rises to 10× and 21×, respec-
tively, due to SGX paging.
6.2 Disk I/O performance
We evaluate disk I/O performance by measuring the sequential
read throughput when reading an uncached 1 GB file from an
SSD. We consider different configurations: (i) unencrypted;
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Figure 7: Network I/O throughput for different buffer sizes
(ii) with full disk encryption (FDE) via dm-crypt using AES-
XTS; and (iii) with FDE and integrity protection via dm-crypt
and dm-integrity using AES-GCM.
Fig. 6 shows that SGX-LKL achieves near native perfor-
mance without encryption or integrity protection, fully saturat-
ing the SSD bandwidth of approx. 510 MB/sec. With FDE, the
throughput decreases to 320 MB/sec (62%) of native through-
put in hardware mode. Enabling integrity protection further
reduces throughput to around 230 MB/sec (45%). This shows
the benefit of using x86-specific cryptographic instructions.
6.3 Network I/O performance
We evaluate network performance by measuring throughput
for different buffer sizes with iperf version 3.1.3 [52].
As Fig. 7 shows, for both native and SGX-LKL, through-
put increases with larger buffer sizes. For 256 byte packets,
SGX-LKL reaches about 0.7× and 0.9× of native throughput
in hardware and simulation modes, respectively. For small
buffers, the throughput is client-bound. Native execution sat-
urates the network bandwidth of about 9.4 Gbps with 4 KB
buffers. Here SGX-LKL reaches a throughput of 5.1 Gbps
(0.5×) in hardware mode, and 5.7 Gbps (0.6×) in simula-
tion mode. Due to its support for TCP segmentation offload-
ing, SGX-LKL performs better for larger buffer sizes: with
64 KB buffers, SGX-LKL reaches a maximum throughput
of 8.4 Gbps (0.9×) and 8.8 Gbps (0.9×) for hardware and
simulation modes, respectively.
With Wireguard and 256 byte buffers, throughput for hard-
ware and simulation mode is 0.44 Gbps and 0.54 Gbps, respec-
tively; with buffers larger than 4 KB, the throughput increases
to 2.0 Gbps and 2.2 Gbps, respectively. Here Wireguard de-
cryption becomes the bottleneck.
7 Related Work
TEE runtime systems. As mentioned in §2.3, Haven [10],
Graphene-SGX [95], and Panoply [87] are existing TEE run-
time systems, but they have wider host interfaces than SGX-
LKL and do not support an oblivious host interface. Similar
to SGX-LKL, SCONE [8] also implements user-level thread-
ing inside the enclave to reduce costly enclave transitions
of threads. Ryoan [46] uses SGX enclaves to sandbox data
processing. It makes the data flow independent from the con-
tent of the input data but does bot make the host interface
oblivious.
ORAM with TEEs can conceal access patterns. Zero-
Trace [84] combines SGX with ORAM to create oblivious
memory primitives. ObliDB [38] and Oblix [67] use Path
ORAM [89] with SGX to hide the access patterns of SQL
queries. In Raccoon [81], Path ORAM hides array accesses
that depend on secrets. By using ORAM, these approaches
can hide access pattern but hosts can still mount Iago attacks
when returning data blocks to the enclave.
Oblivious file systems. Obliviate [2] is an oblivious file sys-
tem for SGX enclaves. It adapts an ORAM protocol to read-
/write a data file. Privatefs [104] is an ORAM-based paral-
lel oblivious file system, which suports concurrent accesses.
Oladi [26] is a cloud-based key/value store that supports obliv-
ious transactions while protecting access patterns from cloud
providers. Bittau et al. [13] introduce an oblivious architec-
ture for monitoring client software behaviour while protecting
user privacy. In constrast to SGX-LKL, these approaches do
not offer a file system abstraction with POSIX semantics.
Unobservable communication. For message systems, hid-
ing which users communicate is challenging. Anonymous
networks such as Tor [31] are susceptible to traffic anal-
ysis attacks [45, 69]. Dining Cryptographers (DC) net-
works [18, 88, 106] provide stronger guarantees by broad-
casting messages to all users, but incur a high overhead. More
recently, Private Information Retrieval (PIR) [5, 22,25] and
differential privacy techniques [9,96,99] add noise to hide the
metadata. These approaches can be leveraged by SGX-LKL
to blind communications.
8 Conclusion
We described SGX-LKL, a TEE runtime system that is de-
signed around a minimal and oblivious host interface. SGX-
LKL executes Linux binaries by using the Linux kernel to
provide POSIX abstractions inside of SGX enclaves, and it
shuffles disk blocks to hide access patterns from the host.
Ignoring SGX paging effects, SGX-LKL’s performance over-
head is low, even for complex applications such as Tensor-
Flow.
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